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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(e)(ii).

ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Whether The Hearing Before The Commission To Determine
Zissi's Tax Liability Under The Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act Was A
Civil Proceeding.
II. Whether The Federal Criminal Exclusionary Rule Should Be
Extended To Apply To A State Civil Tax Proceeding To Exclude
Evidence Of Possession Of Drugs Being Taxed Under The Illegal
Drug Stamp Tax Act.
III. Whether The Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act That Does Not Require
A Drug Dealer To Give His Name Address, Social Security Number,
Or Other Identifying Information On Stamp Purchase Forms Violates
the Privilege Against Self-incrimination.
IV. Whether Criminal Protections Against Cruel And Unusual
Punishment Should Extend To Tax Proceedings For Violation Of The
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act.
V. Whether The Commission Erred In Construing The Tax Rate
Provisions Of The Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act To Tax Petitioner's
Drugs In Tablet Form As Units and Not By Weight.
VI. Whether The Commission Erred By Holding That The Term
"Dosage Unit" Means One Separate Tablet.
VII. Whether The Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act Applies So As To
Single Petitioner Out And Treat Him Differently Than Other Drug
Dealers Possessing Amphetamines In Tablet Form.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The following statutes and constitutional provisions
are dispositive in this case:

U.S. Const, amend. V
Utah Const, art. I § 12
Utah Code Ann. 59-19-101
Utah Code Ann. 59-19-103
Utah Code Ann. 59-19-105
Utah Code Ann. 59-19-106.
The constitutional provisions are attached as
Appendix A.

The statutory provisions are attached as Appendix B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 4, 1988, five officers from the Utah County
Sheriff's Department conducted a driver's license checkpoint.
(R. 99, 115, 251). The checkpoint was established on State Road
73 on the main highway leading out of Fairfield.

(R. 99).

Petitioner Zissi's vehicle stopped at the checkpoint, where one
of the officers smelled "a strong odor of marihuana coming from
inside the vehicle."

(R. 102).

Zissi, Carla Sine, and Darren Reese were in the cab of
the truck.

(R. 103). Upon questioning, Zissi denied having any

marihuana.

(R. 102). The officer requested that Zissi pull his

vehicle off to the side of the road, where he was asked to
surrender his marihuana.

(R. 102-3).

Zissi reached into a

pocket seat cover in the vehicle and produced a baggie of
marihuana for the officer; he also retrieved from the ashtray the
marihuana cigarette that he had just finished smokina.

fP
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The officer, feeling that probable cause had been
established, searched Zissi's vehicle for other illegal
contraband.

(R. 103). A shaving bag was found directly behind

Zissi's seat that contained amphetamine tablets and a flashlight
that Zissi later identfied as his flashlight.
264).

(R. 104, 149, 259,

Darren Reese (passenger) in an affidavit given later swore

that the amphetamines belonged to Zissi, and that Zissi had told
him that they were his.

(R. 180).

There were no Utah drug stamps attached or contained
with the tablets as required pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-19105 (Supp. 1988).

(R. 94). Behind the middle of the truck seat

a briefcase was found that contained $24,440.

(R. 117, 252).

Zissi stipulated at the hearing before the Utah State Tax
Commission ("Commission") that the briefcase was his.

(R. 94).

The Commission, pursuant to the provisions of Title 59,
Chapter 01, Sections 701, 702, Utah Code Ann., 1953, served Zissi
with "Notice And Demand For Payment Of Tax Under Declaration Of
Taxes In Jeopardy".

(R. 195-8, 221). They found that the

official stamps required under the "Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act"
(the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-101 (Supp. 1988), had not
been attached and that the taxes were due and owing.
Tax on eleven units

of amphetamine was assessed at

The total number of pills taxed was 550. The Act provides for
assessment "on each 50 units of a controlled substance that is
not sold by weight. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-103(1)(c)

$2,000 per gram for a total of $22,000 due in taxes, with an
additional $22,000 penalty to be collected as part of the tax as
required by the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106(1) (Supp.
1988), for a total amount due of $44,000.

(R. 196). Warrants

for the delinquent taxes were executed and recorded.

(R. 226-9).

Zissi petitioned the Commission for redetermination of the taxes
and penalty assessed against him.

(R. 235).

At the hearing before the Commission, Zissi argued that
evidence of his amphetamines should be excluded.

(R. 165). The

Commission argued that the exclusionary rule should not apply.
(R. 175).
Both parties presented witnesses to establish the
meaning of "dosage units" as set forth in the Act.
o
Johnson,

Mr. J. Craig

Director of Pharmacy Services at LDS Hospital, and a

pharmacist there since 1970, testified that "[a] dosage unit
would be one tablet."

(R. 153). Exhibit 3 was entered into

evidence in support of Dr. Johnson's testimony.

(R. 182). In

distinguishing a "dosage unit" from a "dosage," he stated that
Cont.
Cont. (Supp. 1988). Thus, 550 pills divided by 50
dosage units = 1 1 units of taxable amphetamine.
Johnson graduated from pharmacy school in 1960 and began work
for LDS Hospital in 1970. (R. 152). Johnson has qualified as an
expert and testified in federal and state courts concerning
pharmacy related matters. (R. 152). Johnson also testified that
he was the director of pharmacy in four different hospitals. (R.
156). Zissi's counsel did not object to his qualification as an
expert. (R. 152).
-4-
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[a] dosage would [be] the amount a person took at one time."

(R. 153). A "unit dose is the way things are packaged."
155).

(R.

He further stated that this is common parlance in the

medical field.

(R. 155).

Detective Kendra Hurlin

3

of the Salt Lake County

Sheriff's Department testified that a dosage unit is an
individual tablet or capsule.

(R. 159-60).

She also testified

that she has never seen amphetamine tablets sold by weight, but
had seen them sold as individual units.

(R. 158). She further

testified that amphetamines sold in powder form are different
chemically and in color to amphetamines sold in tablet form.
4
159). Contrary to the other two witnesses, Loni Deland, a

(R.

defense attorney, testified that a dosage unit is equivalent to a
dose, i.e. the amount a person would shoot into his arm at one
time.

(R. 143). Deland also testified, however, that he did not

recall ever purchasing any amphetamines by weight when they were

Hurlin, at the time of the hearing, had been employed with the
Sheriff's office for over 11 years, and had been a detective
assigned to narcotics for almost 3 years. (R. 158). She has
received narcotics training at "POST" from the DEA, and on-thejob training from other officers with prior experience. (R.
158).
4
At the time of the hearing, Deland had been a member of the
Utah State Bar for 11^ years. (R. 136). Prior to that he had
worked 6 years for the United States Treasury, Bureau of Customs
as an agent. (R. 136). For the three years prior to that he
worked as a narcotics agent for the State of Utah, and the year
before that he had worked as a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff.
Id.
-5-

in pill form.

(R. 138).

Based on this testimony, the Commission found that the
tax assessment of $44,000 was correct.

It entered factual

findings that 550 tablets of amphetamine, an illegal substance,
belonged to Zissi (R. 96); no drug stamps were attached to the
amphetamines (R. 96); the term dosage unit is equivalent to one
pill (R. 7 ) ; amphetamines such as ones at issue are sold as pills
and not by weight.

(R. 7). The Commission further found that

the controlled substance was in pill form, and when in pill form
it is "sold by pill and not by weight."

(R. 10).

It is under these facts that this appeal comes before
the Court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Zissi's hearing before the Commission was a civil tax
proceeding.

Zissi argues that it was a quasi-criminal hearing.

The respondent contends criminal protections do not apply to a
civil tax proceeding.

Case law and rules of statutory

construction show that tax portions of the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax
Act are civil in nature.
The question of whether a penalty is civil or criminal
is a matter of statutory construction that is analyzed on two
levels.

First, the Court should examine whether the legislature

indicated a preference for one label or the other.

Second, the

statutory scheme should be examined to see if it is so punitive
-6-

in either purpose or effect as to negate the legislative label.
The taxes and penalties collected by the Commission are clearly
civil tax penalties.

The Act is not so punitive in nature as to

negate the civil penalties. Where both a civil and criminal
penalty are found in a statute, the force of the argument that
the civil penalty is really a criminal penalty is diluted.

Both

civil and criminal penalties are found in the Act.
The exclusionary rule does not apply to a civil tax
proceeding.

That form of relief is inconsistent with the history

and development of the exclusionary rule on both the State and
Federal levels.

The rule should only be applied where it can

deter violations of the Fourth Amendment.
officers conducted the search.
of the Commission.

In this case, police

They were not under the control

Their primary goal was arrest and prosecution

for criminal law violations, not tax law violations.

The

Commission does not punish for violations of criminal laws.
Thus, the deterrent effect would be highly attenuated if the rule
were to be applied in this case.
This Court has never articulated a state exclusionary
rule for civil cases.
existing precedent.

Such a rule would be inconsistent with

This Court should follow other state courts

and reject the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings.
Zissi has not been compelled to provide selfincriminating evidence.

His arguments fall outside the scope of

-7-

the incrimination privilege.

The Act expressly provides that

drug dealers need not give their name, address, social security
number, or other identifying information on drug stamp purchase
forms.
Zissi also argues that the tax is cruel and unusual
punishment.

His argument is inconsistent with Eighth Amendment

jurisprudence.

The Eighth Amendment has traditionally been used

to prohibit the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment or
excessive fines in the criminal context.

Zissi has failed to

provide Utah case law in support of an extension of Utah or
Federal constitutional provisions to the civil arena.
Zissi's taxes were properly calculated according to the
statute's language and intent.

It is clear as enacted.

Zissi

has the burden of proving that his taxes were improperly
calculated.

He has not met that burden.

The statute sets forth

that amphetamines sold as units are to be taxed as units and not
by weight.

The Commission found that Zissi's amphetamines were

sold as units.

This Court has held that deference should be

given to administrative agency findings of fact.

It is

irrelevant that Zissi's drugs could face a different taxing
scheme if they were ground into powder form.
The statute taxes tablets by dosage units.

The

evidence before the Commission clearly showed that the term
dosage unit means one tablet.

Expert testimony supported the

-R-

Commission's finding that dosage unit means one tablet.
Knowledge of the term dosage unit is common with anyone legallydealing with drugs.

It is self-serving for Zissi to argue that

because he has no medical background the term dosage unit is
vague and unclear to him.
The Act treats Zissi similarly with all other drug
dealers possessing drugs in tablet form.

Even Zissi concedes

that amphetamines that are in tablet form are sold in tablet
form.

Thus, the Commission was correct in taxing them in tablet

form.

Zissi has failed to make a showing that he has been

singled out and treated differently than any other drug dealer
possessing amphetamines in tablet form.

ARGUMENT
ISSUE I
The Hearing Before the Commission Was a Civil Proceeding.
The central inquiry to several of the issues presented
in this proceeding is whether the penalties for violation of the
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-101, ("the
Act") are civil or criminal.

That determination will govern what

procedure applies, and what legal and constitutional standards
should be used.

Case law and rules of statutory construction

establish that the tax portions of the Act are civil.

-9-

A.

Guidelines for Determining if Penalties Are
Civil or Criminal.

The U.S. Supreme Court has established guidelines for
determining if penalties are civil or criminal.
Ward/ 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
followed by this Court.

See U.S. v.

Their approach is sound and should be

The question is a matter of statutory-

construction that is analyzed on two levels.

Ixi. at 248. Those

levels, as described by the Court are:
First/ . . . whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated
either expressly or impliedly a preference
for one label or the other. Second/ where
Congress has indicated an intention to
establish a civil penalty, we have inquired
further whether the statutory scheme was so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to
negate that intention.
In regard to this
latter inquiry, we have noted that 'only the
clearest proof could suffice to establish the
unconstitutionality of a statute on such a
ground.'
Id. at 248-9, (emphasis added, citations omitted) (quoting
Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (I960)).

1.

The Act Clearly Implies Both Separate Civil and Criminal
Penalties.
Under the first level of inquiry, the Act clearly

implies that the tax penalties are civil penalties.

Utah Code

Ann. § 59-19-103 (Supp. 1988) sets forth the tax amount.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-103 (Supp. 1988).
portion of the penalty.

This is the civil

Utah Code Ann. S 59-19-106(1)

-in-

See

establishes a 100% penalty on the unpaid taxes. This is also a
civil penalty that is to be collected as part of the tax.

Id.

It is clear that these are both civil penalties because
the subsection immediately following them states:

"In addition

to the tax penalty imposed, a dealer distributing or possessing
marihuana or controlled substances without affixing the
appropriate stamps, labels, or other indicia is guilty of a third
degree felony and is subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 .
. . ."

Id. at § 59-19-106(2) (emphasis added).

If the

Legislature had intended the entire statute to impose solely a
criminal or civil penalty, it would not have distinguished
between the two by using the "in addition to the tax penalty
imposed" language.

Thus, the legislature clearly expressed a

separate civil tax assessment.

2.

The Act Is Not So Punitive in Nature as to Negate the Civil
Penalties.
In determining whether a statute was "so punitive in

nature to negate the civil penalties", the Supreme Court in U.S.
v. Ward, (referring to Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144
(1963)), reaffirmed the seven factors, previously established,
that have "prove[n] helpful in . . . consideration of similar
questions . . . ." Ward at 249.
The seven factors as originally set forth in MendozaMartinez are:
-11-

[1] Whether
the
sanction
involves
an
affirmative disability or restraint, [2]
whether it has historically been regarded as
a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter,
[4] whether
its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment —
retribution and
deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which
it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an
alternative
purpose
to
which
it
may
rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and [7] whether it appears excessive in
relation to the inquiry, and may often point
in differing directions.
Mendoza-Martinez at 168-9 (emphasis in original, footnotes
deleted).
When these factors are applied, it is clear that the
Act is more civil in nature than penal.

The U.S. Supreme Court

has found that where both a civil and criminal penalty are found
in the same statute, that fact dilutes the force of an argument
that the civil penalty is really a criminal penalty.

Ward at 250

(discussing Helverinq v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (a 50%
penalty for tax fraud was held to be civil).
First, no affirmative disability or restraint applies.
Tax on controlled substances is similar to taxes on alcohol and
tobacco.
205.

See Utah Code Ann. at §§ 59-15-101, 59-16-101, 59-14-

Second, there is no case law in support of the proposition

that payment of tax has historically been viewed as a form of
criminal punishment.

Third, scienter is unnecessary under the

Act for imposition of taxes. The statute requires

-12-

"transportation,"

but not "knowing" transportation for a civil

tax violation to occur*
1988).

Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105(1) (Supp.

Fourth, the traditional aims of retribution and

deterrence are not served by the Act.

The Act imposes

statutorily fixed taxes and penalties on specific substances.
See Utah Code Ann. at § 59-19-103. The taxes are imposed on the
substances, and are not affected by a criminal conviction for
distribution of a controlled substance.

Fifth, the behavior to

which the penalty applies is only a crime if the felony and fine
aspect of § 59-19-106(2) (Supp. 1988) of the Act is applied.
That provision is not within the jurisdiction of the Tax
Commission.

The tax is imposed on the substances; it is not

related to a conviction for distribution of a controlled
substance.

Sixth, assessing a substance that clearly evades

taxation is a proper legislative function.
The alternative purpose assigned to the civil penalty
clearly is not excessive.

The South Dakota Supreme Court was

faced with a similar question in determining if a $750 civil
penalty was excessive for possession of less than one ounce of
marijuana.

See State v. Barber, 427 N.W.2d 375 (S.D. 1988).

That court reasoned:
[W]e find that the civil penalty . . . [for
possession of marijuana] is not so clearly
5
Alternatives to transportation are purchasing, acquiring, or
importing. Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105(1) (Supp. 1988).
-13-

excessive as to bear no relationship to the
purpose for which it is imposed. Drug abuse
is a peril to society and particularly to our
youth. The costs to society in terms of the
health and mental well-being
and lost
potential of young people involved in such
activity
are
incapable
of
estimation.
Further, in attempting to curb drug abuse,
society is required to expend ever increasing
financial resources in law enforcement and
drug awareness and prevention campaigns. The
civil penalty . . . for possession of
marijuana is of but little recompense to
society for these costs.
Id. at 377.
Only the clearest proof is sufficient to establish
that the Act is so punitive as to be unconstitutional.
249.

Ward at

For these reasons, the Court should conclude that the Act's

civil penalties are not criminal in nature.

Thus, the hearing

before the Commission was a civil proceeding.

ISSUE II
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO A CIVIL PROCEEDING
A.

Application of the Exclusionary Rule Would Be
Incorrect in This Case,

The relief sought by the Petitioner is inconsistent
with the history and development of the exclusionary rule on both
the State and Federal levels.

The exclusionary rule has never

been applied to a civil case by the U.S. Supreme Court, nor does
any precedent from that Court or the Utah Supreme Court exist
stating that it should be applied to a civil proceeding on the
state level.
-14-

1.

History and Development of the Exclusionary Rule in the Utah
State and Federal Courts,
Prior to the rule's creation, courts would not suppress

pertinent evidence, although illegally obtained•
New York, 192 U.S. 585, 595 (1904).

See Adams v.

This changed when the

exclusionary rule was announced in Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383
(1914).

The Court reasoned that without this judicial protection

the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures would become meaningless.

Ld. at 393.

It stated that

"The Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of
. . . officials.
and its agencies."

Its limitations reach the Federal Government
JId. at 398.

However, because Weeks was not then binding on the
states, the Utah State Supreme Court expressly rejected its
application to state court proceedings.

State v. Aime, 220 P.

704, 708 (Utah 1923); see also State v. Fair, 353 P.2d 615 (Utah
1960).

The Utah Court reasoned that this constitutional right

would be protected by subjecting the individual conducting the
unreasonable search and seizure "to all consequences and
penalties provided by law."

][d. at 707. This rationale was

directly contrary to the federal rule that was not directed at
"individual misconduct".
However, this state independence came to an end when
the U.S. Supreme Court announced that the exclusionary rule would
-15-

be binding on state courts. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
The underpinnings of that decision were that the exclusionary
rule would protect "the imperative of judicial integrity" by
compelling the government to comply with the "charter of its own
existence".
222 (I960)).

I^i. at 658-9 (quoting Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206,
In a later case, the Court made clear that

"[j]udicial integrity clearly does not mean that the courts must
never admit evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment."

U.S. v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976).

The Utah State Supreme Court was thus compelled to
apply the rule it had expressly rejected in Aime.

See State v.

Jasso, 439 P.2d 844 (Utah 1968).
The rationale of "the imperative of judicial
integrity," expressed by the Court in Mapp, was later eclipsed by
a policy of deterrence.

In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)

the Supreme Court specified that "[t]he primary justification for
the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct
that violates Fourth Amendment Rights."

Id. at 486.

The Court

restricted application of the rule "to those areas where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."
Id. at 487-8 (quoting U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974)).
In a corresponding footnote, the Court cited a noted
criminal law commentator!

"[T]he rule is a needed, but

-16-

grud[g]ingly [sic] takenf medicament; no more should be swallowed
than is needed to combat the disease . . . so many criminals must
go free as will deter the constables from blundering . . .
[however] the confines of necessity inflicts gratuitous harm on
the public interest."

Stone at 487 n.24 (citing to Amsterdam,

Search, Seizure, and Section 2255:

A Comment, 112 U. Pa.L.Rev.

378, 388-9 (1964)).

2.

Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Civil Matters in
Federal Cases,
In United States v. Janis, the U.S. Supreme Court was

asked to apply the exclusionary rule to a tax proceeding.

In

JaniS/ the Los Angeles police obtained a warrant to search
Janis's residence for bookmaking paraphernalia.
Cash and wagering records were seized.

][d. at 434.

Jd. at 436. A police

officer informed the IRS of these records.

Id.

Based on this

information Janis was assessed wagering taxes. ^Ed. at 437. The
IRS levied on Janis's cash that had been seized by the Los
Angeles Police.

Id.

A subsequent non-federal criminal action was brought,
where Janis successfully suppressed the evidence seized by the
Los Angeles Police Department; the judge ordered all items
returned except the cash levied by the IRS.

Id. at 437-8.

Janis

filed for a refund of the cash. .Id. at 438. The IRS denied the
request and a subsequent U.S. District Court action was filed by
-17-

Janis where he sought to suppress all evidence from which the
assessment had been made.

Id.

The Supreme Court held "that the judicially created
exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the use in the
civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized by a
criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign."
459-60.

The Court expressly stated:

Ijd. at

"In the complex and

turbulent history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to
exclude evidence from a civil proceeding/ federal or state."
at 447 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).

Id.

The Court expressly

left the question open of the rules application where
"intrasovereign" violations have taken place.

I_d. at 456.

In reaching its conclusion, the court weighed the
"likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police . . .
[against] the societal costs imposed by the exclusion . . . ."
Id. at 454.
The Court reasoned that "the deterrent effect of the
exclusion of relevant evidence is highly attenuated when the
'punishment' imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement
officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or
against a different sovereign."

Id. at 458. The Court went on

The Court stated: "[t]he seminal cases that apply the
exclusionary rule to a civil proceeding involve "intrasovereign"
violations,[] a situation we need not consider here." Janis at
456 (footnote omitted).
-18-

to state:
This
attenuation,
coupled
with
the
existing deterrence effected by the denial of
use of the evidence by either sovereign in
the criminal trials with which the searching
officer is concerned, creates a situation in
which the imposition of the exclusionary rule
sought in this case is unlikely to provide
significant, much less substantial additional
deterrence. It falls outside the offending
officer's zone of primary interest.
Id,

(Emphasis added).
The Court decided that the societal costs imposed by

the rule were too severe because "the enforcement of admittedly
valid laws would be hampered by so extending the exclusionary
rule, and, as is nearly always the case with the rule, concededly
relevant and reliable evidence would be rendered unavailable."
^d. at 447.
This appeal is similar to the Janis case. A criminal
action was brought against Zissi for possession of illegal drugs.
County law enforcement officers conducted the roadblock.
However, these law enforcement officers were not being controlled
by the Commission, nor does the Commission have any authority to
control their activities.

The County is a different sovereign

than the State Tax Commission.
attenuated.

Their relationship is extremely

Application of the rule here is unlikely to provide

significant or substantial additional deterrence because
enforcement of tax laws falls outside the arresting officers zone
of primary interest.
-19-

In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court resolved any
questions of application of the exclusionary rule between related
governments.
In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the issue it had expressly left open in
Janis:

Whether the exclusionary rule applies in a civil case

involving intrasovereign violations.

In Lopez-Mendoza, Lopez-

Mendoza challenged the deportation order of an immigration judge
because his alien status had come to the attention of officials
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) by illegal
means.

Id. at 1034.

The Court found that a "deportation

proceeding is a purely civil action . . . ," id. at 1038,
although it "is a civil complement to a possible criminal
prosecution . . . ."

Icl. at 1042.

The immigration judge could

not "adjudicate guilt or punish . . . for any crime related to
unlawful entry into or presence in this country.

Consistent with

the civil nature of the proceeding, various protections that
apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a
deportation hearing."

Id. at 1038.

The Court, in applying the balancing test of Janis
concluded that exclusion would not deter the INS from Fourth
Amendment violations because of a comprehensive scheme by the INS
to prevent this type of conduct,

^i*. at 1046.

On the other side

of the equation, the Court found that the social cost was "both

unusual and significant."

Id.

It stated that ongoing violations

of immigration law would occur, Jd., that the "streamlined"
deportation hearing would become cumbersome, Id. at 1048, and
that administration of the exclusionary rule by the Board of
Immigration Appeals would become costly.

Ld. at 1048-9. Thus,

the Court found the exclusionary rule inapplicable in civil cases
involving intrasovereign violations where the balancing test of
Janis is satisfied.
The Lopez-Mendoza case is substantially similar to this
appeal.

The tax proceedings held before the Commission are

purely civil actions.

They are civil complements to possible

criminal prosecutions held before a court with proper
jurisdiction.

The Commission may not adjudicate guilt, nor may

it punish for violations of any criminal drug statutes.
Consistent with these civil proceedings, it would be
inappropriate for criminal protections to apply.
Exclusion of evidence by the Commission would not deter
county and other law enforcement agencies from Fourth Amendment
violations.

Their primary goal is arrest and prosecution for

criminal law violations, not tax law violations. Application of
the rule would have both unusual and significant social costs.
Evidence of drugs and drug sales that escape taxation would be
barred, leaving the community to bear the burdens of the social
ills they cause, Administrative hearings before the Commission
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would become cumbersome. Additional costs, time requirements,
and hearings would be required to resolve the issue of
admissibility and judicial review could be required whenever the
rule was brought into play.

This court should apply the

reasoning of Lopez-Mendoza and Janis to this case.

3. Application of the Exclusionary Rule by State Courts,
This Court should reject Zissi's argument that the
exclusionary rule should apply in state civil actions.
cites no Utah case law in support of his proposition.

Zissi
This Court

has never articulated a state exclusionary rule for civil cases.
Some state courts have rejected the application of the
rule in civil proceedings.

Prior to the Mapp decision, that was

the posture of this Court.

See State v. Aime, 220 P. 704, 708,

(1923).

Because Mapp is only applicable in criminal proceedings,

this Court's decision in Aime should still govern application of
the exclusionary rule in state civil cases. Aime was not
overruled, even though Mapp was made applicable on the states and
became the supreme law of the land in criminal cases.
The Aime Court expressly rejected the exclusionary rule
for the following reasons:
The law cannot be justly administered without
a knowledge of the facts in dispute.
The
purpose of evidence is to establish the truth
in legal tribunals, in order that justice may
be done.
The facilities for accomplishing
this purpose ought not to be diminished
-22-

without cogent reasons. In determining the
competency of evidence, the essential test is
its credibility and its value in discovering
the truth.
Aime at 707. For these reasons, this Court should not overrule
Aime.
Other state courts have refused to apply the
exclusionary rule in civil cases. The Supreme Court of Virginia,
in County of Henrico v. Ehlers, 379 S.E.2d 457 (Va. 1989) held:
"[T]he Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be extended
from criminal cases to civil cases."

Id. at 462. That court

reasoned that deterrence is not served by the rule because
"[t]here exists not empirical proof of the exclusionary rule's
effectiveness."

Ici. That court further rejected the rule

because "[i]t makes reliable and probative evidence unavailable;
it deflects the truth-finding process; it risks engendering
disrespect for law by promoting procedure above the fundamental
search for truth and justice."

Id.

This Court should not expand the exclusionary rule to
apply to a civil tax proceeding.

Zissi's cited federal case law

is clearly distinguishable from the facts of this appeal.
Petitioner's Opening Brief at 13-15 (No. 890317).

See

He argues that

U.S. v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966) holds that the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary is rule applicable in a federal
civil tax proceeding.

That case presents the issues later

disposed of in Janis.

In Blank, IRS agents were the violators of
-23-

the Fourth Amendment; they were also the party attempting to
introduce the illegally seized evidence.

Blank at 181. Thus,

the deterrence rationale in that case provided a safeguard for
violations of the rule.

Id., at 182. For these same reasons,

Vander Linden v. U.S.f 502 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Iowa 1980) is also
inapplicable.

In that case, the IRS was also the violator of the

Fourth Amendment and the party attempting to introduce the
illegally seized evidence. jrd. at 697. Pizzarello v. U.S., 408
F.2d 579 (2d. Cir. 1969) and Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792
(1972), cited by Zissi, are distinguishable because the
Commission was not involved in seizing Petitioner's amphetamines.
Pizzarello arose prior to both Janis and Lopez-Mendoza, when
" [widespread uncertainty [was] prevalent on the issue of whether
evidence, inadmissible in a criminal case, can be used for other
purposes . . . ."

Pizzarello at 585. The uncertainties of that

case have been resolved by Janis and Lopez-Mendoza•

Thus,

Pizzarello has been refined and replaced by these later holdings.
Suarez likewise does not apply.
expressly overruled its holding in Suarez.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 2724 (1982).

The Tax Court has
See Guzzetta v.

The deterrence rationale,

articulated in Janis, has made the rule inapplicable under the
facts of Suarez.
Zissi also argues that the Act functions similarly to a
forfeiture proceeding.

He claims that One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
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Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) should apply.

In that case,

the state asked for the forfeiture of the automobile in question
as a penalty for the violation of a criminal statute.

The

Pennsylvania statute in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan required an
alcohol "bootlegger" to forfeit any rights in property used in
illegal liquor activities such as transportation.
n.2.

Ijd. at 694

As noted in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, a forfeiture

proceeding is instituted, in civil form, for violations of the
criminal law.

Id., at 697. The penalties are affixed to the

criminal acts and are thus viewed as quasi-criminal in nature.
Id.
Zissi argues that since the exclusionary rule applies
to forfeiture cases which are quasi-criminal, it should also
apply to drug stamp cases on the grounds that they are quasicriminal, the rationale being if the exclusionary rule applies to
one set of quasi-criminal cases it should apply to all such
cases.

The respondent argues that the reasoning of the

petitioner is flawed and that the proper test is the two prong
test expounded in U.S. v. Ward, supra.

(See also U.S. v. One

Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) for a discussion
of civil versus criminal sanctions.)
The Drug Stamp Act does not function as a forfeiture
case.

It brings a civil tax assessment independent of criminal

drug violations.

There is no showing that the Legislature
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intended the Drug Stamp Act to be criminal and punitive, it is
clearly a civil sanction.

The Act requires purchase and display

of revenue stamps. The Act taxes a particular activity and
substances.
criminal law.

It does not impose a penalty for violation of a
The Commission does not determine whether there

has been a criminal conviction, nor must it prove the elements
necessary for violation of criminal drug statutes. The Act
functions independently of them.

The Commission does not enforce

criminal law violations; nor do county officials bring civil tax
proceedings against the violator.

This independence between

civil tax and criminal matters shows that both operate on
independent grounds and that neither is dependent on the other.
This is contrary to the operation of a forfeiture proceeding as
described in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan.

ISSUE III
ZISSI HAS NOT BEEN COMPELLED TO PROVIDE SELFINCRIMINATING EVIDENCE
This Court has held that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is applicable in civil proceedings if
a threat of criminal prosecution exists.

See Affleck v. Third

Judicial Dist. Court, 655 P.2d 665, 666 (Utah 1982).
Zissi has failed to show that his privilege against
self-incrimination was violated.

His argument falls outside the

scope of the self-incrimination privilege.
-26-

The Fifth Amendment

to the United States Constitution provides:

"No person shall be

. . • compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."
similar:

U.S. Const, amend. V.

The Utah State Constitution is

"In criminal prosecutions . . . [t]he accused shall not

be compelled to give evidence against himself."

Utah Const, art.

I § 12.
The Act does not compel self-incriminating information.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held, absent coercion, information
freely given is harmonious with the Fifth Amendment:
Voluntary statements remain a proper element
in law enforcement. Indeed, far from being
prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of
guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are
inherently desirable . . . absent some
officially coerced self accusation, the Fifth
Amendment privilege is not violated by even
the most damning admissions.
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1984).

Zissi's completion

of the required forms would have been voluntary and not violative
of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The Act explicitly provides:

"Dealers are not required

to give their name, address, social security number, or other
identifying information on the form."
105(3)(Supp. 1988).
given voluntarily.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-

Any incriminating evidence would have been
There is no showing that incriminating

information is required; therefore, compulsion is absent for a
finding of violation of the U.S. or Utah Constitutions.
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Even if the Act could be viewed as compulsory, the
information would not incriminate, which is a requirement of
these constitutional provisions.
a benign act, not a crime.
purchase them.

The purchase of drug stamps is

Stamp collectors or anyone else may

Hypothetically, employees of the Commission could

provide law enforcement officials with a purchaser's physical
description or automobile license plate number, but that did not
happen here.
argument.

Until it does, the court need not address that

This Court has held that complaints in the abstract

are insufficient to make a statute unconstitutional.

Greaves v.

State, 528 P.2d 805, 808 (Utah 1984).
The United States Supreme Court addressed the scope of
incriminating evidence in Marchetti v. U.S., 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
In Marchetti, a taxpayer was convicted for failing to pay an
occupation tax and obtain a revenue stamp.

He was convicted of

failing to complete the IRS form required of all persons in the
business of accepting wagers.

Id at 41. The forms required the

gambler's residence, business addresses, whether the registrant
was in the business of accepting wagers, and the names and
addresses of agents and employees.

Id. at 42. The registrants

were obliged to post the stamp in their place of business, or, if
they had none, to carry it for display upon demand of a treasury
officer.

Id. at 43. The Statute required that a list of all

registrants be provided upon the request of any state or local
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prosecuting officer.

JEd.

The statute gave no immunity from

prosecution to registrants.

Ijd. at 44.

A former Commissioner of

the IRS "...acknowledged that the Service 'makes available'" to
law enforcement agencies the names and addresses of those who
have paid the wagering taxes, and that it is in "full
cooperation" with the efforts of the Attorney General of the
United States to suppress organized gambling.

JId. at 48.

The Court based its decision of unconstitutionality on
the following principles:
1)

The area was permeated with criminal statutes.

2)

Those engaged in the activity were a group
inherently suspect of criminal activities.

3)

Those required, on pain of criminal prosecution,
to provide information could reasonably suppose
that the information given would be made available
to prosecuting authorities to provide a
significant link in a chain of evidence that would
establish guilt.

4)

"The central standard [of] the privilege
application ... [was] whether the claimant [was]
confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not
merely trifling or imaginary hazards of
incrimination."

Id. at 47-53.
The Court concluded that the area of gambling was
permeated with criminal statutes, and that as a group, those
accepting wagers were suspect of criminal activity.

The Court

found that the stamps were to be posted conspicuously, and they
had often been admitted at trial in state and federal gambling
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prosecutions.

It also found that a significant link in a chain

of evidence existed because the statute required revenue offices
to provide prosecutors with a list of those paying the tax.

A

former IRS Commissioner admitted that this information was made
available to federal prosecutors.

The Court also concluded that

the registrants were confronted with real, and not trifling or
imaginary hazards of incrimination, and the registrants could
expect prosecution under state gambling laws.
However, the Court restricted its holding to the facts
of the case:
If, in different circumstances, a taxpayer is
not confronted by substantial hazards of
self-incrimination, or if he is otherwise
outside the privileges protection, nothing we
decide today would shield him from the
various penalties prescribed by the wagering
statutes.
Id. at 61.
There are similarities between Marchetti and Zissi's
case; however, the distinctions make Marchetti inapplicable.
Illegal drug dealing is an area permeated with criminal statutes.
Drug dealers would be a group inherently suspect of criminal
activities, because their activities are illegal.
However, the information does not provide a link in the
chain of evidence.

The statute does not require the Commission

to provide prosecutors with a list of those purchasing the
stamps; the stamps need not be displayed in open view, nor is

there any evidence that the stamps have been admitted in a state
c :i : federal clnni prosecution.

Further, Zissi lacks even a

scintill a of evidence that the Commission Udh I M I HHI kmake drug stamp sale information available
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Zissi argues that Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6
(1969), applies.

However, the Federal Marihuana Act is

substantially different than the Act at issue here.

The Federal

Act required a dealer to register and give his name and place of
business to the nearest district office of the Internal Revenue
Service.

Leary at 14. That Act also required all marihuana

transfers to be registered with the IRS on a form showing the
name and address of the transferor and transferee and the amount
of marihuana being transferred,

^[d. at 15. This information was

to be made available to law enforcement officials.

Duplicates of

the forms were to be open to inspection by "Treasury personnel
and state and local officials charged with enforcement of
marihuana laws," with the requirement that these officials be
furnished with copies of the forms.

Ijd. As discussed supra, the

Act fails to make any of these incriminating demands.

Thus,

Leary does not apply.

ISSUE IV
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND
ARTICLE I § 9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION ARE NOT APPLICABLE
TO A CIVIL TAX PROCEEDING
The taxes and penalties of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106
(Supp. 1988) do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
issues before the Commission were issues of taxation.

The

While the

statute provides a criminal penalty, that issue is not before the
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jurisdiction over these criminal
matters.
:i

Eighth Amendment has traditionally been used to
shment oi

excessive fines : *• •:.. criminal context.
430 U.S. 651

"

See Ingraham v. Wright,

;

Wh<
confronted with claims that the Eighth Amendment applies to cases
outside the criminal area

grounds that the penalties were

cruel and unusual punishmen
Id. at; 66' If

As set: forth, above,

i "omiti iss if if i wii
Zissi

In

i

inn^pl ralih*.

-.. proceeding before the

in |U"oceedin

-~

^ r 4~ * * a d o p t

s p o s i t i o n and p l a c e t a x a t i o n w i t h i n t h e w e ± , ^JI„.L< i

limits of the Eighth Amendment would require

•:
» back

.

Zissi has failed to provide any Utah case ] a;w i i :
support of his argument.

His argument should be rejected.

ISSUE V
Taxes Were Properly Calculated According to the Statutory Scheme.
Zissi was properly assessed on: n 1 m I s i ] ] ega ] cii: i igs
statute was applied as enacted
Commi B S ion appl i rati c •
penalties assessed by

The fundamental rules governing

"" *"lio Act are:

] | any taxes and

Commission, pursua

The

presumed correct; the taxpayer bears the burden to prove
otherwise, Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106(4) (Supp. 1988); 2) " [i]t
is the responsibility of the Commission and of the Court to
interpret and apply the statutes as enacted," McKendrick v. State
Tax Comm'n, 347 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1959); and 3) doubts as to
the meaning of terms in tax statutes are to be resolved in favor
of the taxpayer. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 395 P.2d 57, modified 399 P.2d 145, (Utah 1964).
The statute is clear as enacted.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-

19-103 (Supp. 1988) establishes the tax on controlled substances:
(1) A tax is imposed on marihuana and
controlled substances as defined under this
chapter at the following rates:
(a) * * *
(b) on each gram of controlled substance,
or each portion of a gram, $200; and
(c) on each 50 dosage units of a
controlled substance that is not sold by
weight, or portion thereof, $2,000.
Thus, in applying these provisions, the issue is whether
amphetamines in pill form are sold by weight or in dosage units.
This provision of the statute is clear, it requires a factual
determination on how amphetamines in pill form are sold.

Zissi

has not met his burden of proving otherwise.
The Commission found that amphetamines, in pill form,
are sold as pills and not by weight.

(R. 7). Deference is given

to administrative agency findings of fact.
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Hurley v. Bd. of

Review of Indus. Comm f n, 767 P. 2d 524 , 527 (Utah 1 988)
c - -^
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scl leme.
It i s irrelevant that these pills would face a
different ia/
form.

scheme
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different physical

^he* e\ . -. :.

amphetamine sol . a powder form an altogether different substance
fails *
this difference,
the problem.

address

Instead he suggests an a I Lernativt; djpiin I. I. •

Zissi's approach

unworkable; it exalts form over
mandate on how

illegal drugs should :- taxed.
sense approach.
\ «.„!" i ,1 I, I! "

Drugs marketed in non-weight form (e.g. tablets)

It. n i , x e < I ii!1". ni mi i ni ni I "i

be taxed by weigh

The Legislature took a common

"iiilhist a n c e s .

t i n "nil
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1
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iiiiiii I'I u n i t

w i l l

: is approach should be upheld.

7
Where
greater
factual
sold in

constitutional rights are at stake, a court may exercise
scrutiny. Hurley at 527 n.3. Here, the issue is a
determination of the form of taxation for amphetamines
pill form.
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ISSUE VI
The Term "Dosage Unit" Is Clear and Understandable
For Due Process Purposes. It Was Correctly
Interpreted By the Commission.
Dr. J. Craig Johnson, Director of Pharmacy Services at
LDS Hospital, and a pharmacist there since 1970, testified that
"[a] dosage unit would be one tablet."

(R. 153). In

distinguishing a "dosage unit" from a "dosage," he stated that
"[a] dosage would [be] the amount a person took at one time."
(R. 153). Exhibit 3 was introduced into evidence in support of
Dr. Johnson's testimony.

(R. 182). It showed that the term

"unit dose" is the equivalent of "tablet."
attempted to redefine this term.

(R. 182). Zissi has

However, he makes no

understandable distinction between "dosage" and "dosage unit".
Dr. Johnson further stated that the term dosage unit is
common parlance in the medical field to mean "the way it comes
packaged."

(R. 155). "Be it one suppository or one tablet."

(R. 155). The terms dosage unit and unit dose are used
interchangeably.

(R. 156). Thus, the evidence shows that the

Commission correctly interpreted the Act.
Zissi argues that the term "dosage units" is unclear
and so the statute is vague.
35 (No. 890317).
means "dosage."
890317).

See Petitioner's Opening Brief at

He argues that the term "dosage unit" really
See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 39 (No.

He contends that "[a] person of ordinary intelligence
-36-

w o u l d understand t h e statute that w a y ,

at 3v

le goes

on t o s a y that a dusdiji M H J I I I hi '"ill In

^mewhere

b e t w e e n "50-100 pills.1""

onfuse an

1«j at 4 0 . This attempt i

*rwise clear statutory provision should b e rejected.

As Dr.

Johnson rlearl ;y tes l:i fi eel, a i i I =>i lppor ted
: '••

-

"dosage unit" means "the w a y something comes
suppository or o n e tablet."

r

The statutory language provides a clear,
understandable standard for assessing drugs
1 :i :i s ap pi: oacl I c • ::: i :i Il d meai I <
Commission's interpretation
With

As Zissi c o n c e d e s ,

•

tablet s . T h e
tatute should n.» b e replaced

Zissi's effort uj confuse i t .

ISSUE V I I
The Ac t operates Equally Upon Each Individual In Each
Legislatively Designated Class,
"Equrjl |ii<ii<rfion protects against discrimination
within a class.

State T a x Comm'n v . p e p y t of Fin.,

1 2 9 7 , 1 2 9 8 (Utah 1978)

general principle being that

"pei HI HI

should 1 >e treated similarly, a n d

,.! in i in i si

p e r s o n s i n different circumstances should n o t b e treated as 1 I
t h e i r circumstances w e r e the same."

M a l a n v . L e w i s , 693 P.2d

Several factors govern equal protection.

First, the

l e g i s l a t u r e is given considerable discretion t o designate classes
-37-

as long as these designations operate equally on all persons
situated similarly.
MaIan at 670.

Department of Finance at 1298; see also

Second, when there are differences in treatment,

"the classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable
tendency to further the objectives of the statute."
670.

Malan at

Administrative convenience has been identified as a valid

reason for difference in treatment.

See Hansen v. Pub. Employees

Retirement Bd. of Admin., 246 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah, 1952); see
also Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 511 (1937).
The Act establishes three classes of drugs to be taxed:
1.

Marihuana;

2.

Controlled substances sold by weight; and

3.

Controlled substances not sold by weight.

Utah Code Ann. §59-19-103(1) (Supp. 1988).
Zissi argues that he is being discriminated against
because his amphetamines could be ground into powder form and
taxed as a substance sold by weight.

However, the evidence shows

that amphetamine sold in powder form is a different substance
than amphetamines sold in tablet form.

(R. 159). Zissi fails to

address the distinction between crystallized amphetamine and that
in tablet form like he possessed.
powder form is misleading.

His argument on amphetamine in

He lumps all amphetamines into one

class where clearly more than one class exists.

-38-

Even i £ these substances were identical, the equal
protec t::i ::: i 1 i: u ]| <= s zi t e d s u p i a ii t* i i < nis i f II i MI I *i i I 11 I he Commission's
application of the Act

The Act, situates Zissi similarly with

all other drug dealers possessing drugs i n tablet form.
group MI dealer i - i i- i r i w i j

units

i i i il i n i l

' iiiiiiiiiii i n i M i iji i s i q i >

tah /ode Ann. §59-19-103 . (Supp. 1988

]
drugs

ill

Th i •>

m a t i o n operates equal
, ui.it.

dealers ^ -

r -

, .L,L . concedes \:

,

by the pil l c • quanti !

• vi JI B when

P*-

; J f '^rr . 5
89031

Thus, Ziss: *

& ^ t p .. .

drugs should be taxed according

.i lu i

sold as units.
Thin'/1" ! Ii r 't:je s e p a r a t.f

" I ••isiir'.'-'i e s t a b I i s h e r l I >y t h e

legislature distinguish between marihuana, drugs sold by weight
and drugs sold in unit1-"

,». ' drug dealers within these classes

are treated similarly "I
class

',« -Ji n , IIM Itii s \ * '

,

P '..'fin

The differences between these classes allow the taxation

objectives

>±. uiie statute *

classifications, the stat.

accomplished.

Without these

I I M ' i iii| n i :i h 11 J J i' I

• 111 III i 111 ii I tj r .

Clearly these classifications accomplish the legislative purpose
c III I 11 >. mi mi i | i I 1 IMII j 11II " u b s t a n c e s .
Zissi argues that he is being treated as
Insurance Fund was
r

e

State Tax Comm'n v. Dep't of Fin. f supra.
singled out from among all

other insurers to bear a special tax.

Zissi has failed to make a

showing that he has been singled out and treated differently than
any other drug dealer possessing amphetamines in tablet form.
Thus, he has failed to show a due process violation.

CONCLUSION
The Commission correctly interpreted the Drug Stamp Act
in determining the tax and penalty that is due and owing.
The Commission further asserts that the matter is a
civil matter not subject to the exclusionary rule, that there is
no showing of a violation of petitioner's right against selfincrimination or his being subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment.
Finally, this Court should uphold the constitutionality
of the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Act, Utah Code Ann. §59-19-101, et
seq., and affirm the order of the Commission.
DATED this (k

day of January, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

L.A. DEV^
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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Salt Lak0 City, Utah 84111
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT V

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy therightto a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed; which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence.

1

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

APPENDJI X A

ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT

59-19-103

CHAPTER 19
ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT
Section
59-19-101.
59-19-102.
59-19-103.

Section
Short title.
Definitions.
Tax imposed on marihuana and
controlled substances.
Stamps, evidencing tax paid to be
provided and sold by the commission.
Stamps to be affixed to marihuana and controlled substance

— Anonymity provided when
purchasing stamps.
59-19-106. Civil penalty — Criminal penalty
— Statute of limitations — Burden of proof.
59-19-107. Commission to administer tax —
No criminal immunity for
dealers.

Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1988, ch. 11,
§§ 1 to 14, also enacted a new § 59-19-101 et
seq. Because of the enactment of § 59-19-101

et seq. by Laws 1988, ch. 246, §§ 1 to 7, the
provisions enacted by Laws 1988, ch. 11, were
renumbered as § 59-20-101 et seq.

59-19-104.
59-19-105.

59-19-101. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act."
History: C. 1953, 59-19-101, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 246, { 1.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988.

59-19-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Controlled substance" means any drug or substance, whether real
or counterfeit, as defined in Section 58-37-2, that is held, possessed, transported, transferred, sold, or offered to be sold in violation of Utah laws. It
does not include marihuana.
(2) "Dealer" means a person who, in violation of Utah law, manufactures, produces, ships, transports, or ximports into Utah or in any manner
acquires or possesses more than A2 k grams of marihuana, or seven or
more grams of any controlled substance, or ten or more dosage units of
any controlled substance which is not sold by weight.
(3) "Marihuana" means any marihuana, whether real or counterfeit, as
defined in Section 58-37-2, that is held, possessed, transported, transferred, sold, or offered to be sold in violation of Utah laws.
History: C. 1953, 59-19-102, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 246, t 2.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988.

59-19-103. Tax imposed on marihuana and controlled substances.
(1) A tax is imposed on marihuana and controlled substances as defined
under this chapter at the following rates:
(a) on each gram of marihuana, or each portion of a gram, $3.50;
143
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REVENUE AND TAXATION

(b) on each gram of controlled substance, or each portion of a gram,
$200; and
(c) on each 50 dosage units of a controlled substance that is not sold by
weight, or portion thereof, $2,000.
(2) For the purpose of calculating the tax under this chapter, a quantity of
marihuana or other controlled substance is measured by the weight of the
substance, whether pure or impure or dilute, or by dosage units when the
substance is not sold by weight, in the dealer's possession. A quantity of a
controlled substance is dilute if it consists of a detectable quantity of pure
controlled substance and any excipients or fillers.
History: C. 1953, 59-19-103, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 246, § 3.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988.

59-19-104. Stamps, evidencing tax paid to be provided and
sold by the commission.
(1) The commission shall adopt a uniform system 0 f providing, affixing, and
displaying official stamps, official labels, or other official indicia for marihuana and controlled substances on which a tax is imposed.
(2) A dealer may not possess any marihuana or controlled substance upon
which a tax is imposed by this chapter, unless the tax has been paid on the
marihuana or other controlled substance as evidenced by a stamp or other
official indicia.
(3) Official stamps, labels, or other indicia to be affixed to all marihuana or
controlled substances shall be purchased from the commission. The purchaser
shall pay 100% of face value for each stamp, label, or other indicia at the time
of the purchase.
History: C. 1953, 59-19-104, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 246, § 4,

Effective Dates. - - Laws 1988, ch. 248, § 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988,

59-19-105. Stamps w oe affixed to marihuana and controlled substance — Anonymity provided when
purchasing stamps.
(1) When a dealer purchases, acquires, transports, or imports into this state
marihuana or controlled substances, he shall permanently affix the official
indicia on the marihuana or controlled substances evidencing the payment of
the tax required under this chapter. No stamp or other official indicia may be
used more than once.
(2) Taxes imposed upon marihuana or controlled substances by this chapter
are due and payable immediately upon acquisition or possession in this state
by a dealer.
(3) Payments required by this chapter shall be made to the commission on
forms provided by the commission. Dealers are not required to give their
name, address, Social Security number, or other identifying information on
the form The commission shall collect all taxes imposed under this chapter
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ENTERPRISE ZONE ACT
History: C. 1953,59-19-105, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 246, I 5.

59-19.107

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988.

59-19-106. Civil penalty — Criminal penalty — Statute of
limitations — Burden of proof.
(1) Any dealer violating this chapter is subject to a penalty of 100% of the
tax in addition to the tax imposed by Section 59-19-103. The penalty shall be
collected as part of the tax.
(2) In addition to the tax penalty imposed, a dealer distributing or possessing marihuana or controlled substances without affixing the appropriate
stamps, labels, or other indicia is guilty of a felony of the third degree and is
subject to a fine of not more than $10,000, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of the criminal laws of this state,
an information, indictment, or complaint may be filed upon any criminal
offense under this chapter within six years after the commission of this offense.
(4) Any tax and penalties assessed by the commission are presumed to be
valid and correct. The burden is on the taxpayer to show their incorrectness or
invalidity.
History: C. 1953, 59-19-106, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 246, i 6.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988.

59-19-107. Commission to administer tax — No criminal
immunity for dealers.
(1) The commission shall administer this chapter and may adopt rules necessary to enforce this chapter.
(2) Nothing in this chapter requires persons lawfully in possession of marihuana or a controlled substance to pay the tax required under this chapter.
(3) Nothing in this chapter provides immunity of any kind for a dealer from
criminal prosecution under Utah law.
History: C. 1953, 59-19-107, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 246, I 7.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988.

CHAPTER 20
ENTERPRISE ZONE ACT
Section
59-20-101. Short title.
59-20-102. Definitions.
59-20-103. Powers of the Department of
Community and Economic Development.
59-20-104. Criteria for designation of enterprise tones — Application.
59-20-105. Qualifying local contributions —
Employee categories.
59-20-106. Eligibility review.

Section
69*20-107.
59*20-108.
59*20-109.
59*20-110.
59-20-111.
59-20-112.

Quarterly consideration.
Duration of designation.
Contingent designations.
Revocation of designations.
Disqualifying transfers.
Businesses qualifying for tax incentives.
59-20-113. State tax credits.
59-20-114. Annual report.
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